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Clean Air, Clear Processes?
The Struggle over Air Pollution Law in
the People's Republic of China
by
WILLIAM P. ALFORD* AND BENJAMIN L. LIEBMAN**
As the People's Republic of China (PRC or China) seeks to use
law to address environmental problems, it faces daunting challenges,
in terms both of the magnitude of environmental degradation it is
experiencing and the capacity of its legal institutions. Pollution levels
in the major cities in the PRC are among the highest on earth.
Epidemiological studies indicate that the concentration of airborne
particulates is two to five times the maximum level deemed
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acceptable by the World Health Organization.' A noted World Bank
study based on conservative assumptions estimates that as of the mid-
1990s urban air and water pollution alone costs the Chinese economy
US$32.3 billion annually in premature deaths, morbidity, restricted
activity, chronic bronchitis, and other health effects.2 And new
scholarly work suggests that the "health impacts fall
disproportionately on women and children. '3
China's lawmakers have not ignored these problems. The PRC
has in recent years sought to enlist the law to address its
environmental ills. In 19954 and then again in 2000,5 China undertook
significant revisions of its principal air pollution law, while throughout
the decade of the 1990s it promulgated discrete measures concerning
coal production, acid rain, and associated matters. To date, these
legal changes have at best had a minor impact on the Chinese
environment, but as we know from Bruce Ackerman and William
Hassler's classic study of the making of air pollution law in the United
States, Clean Coal/Dirty Air, even in highly-developed legal systems,
efforts through law to address such issues pose massive challenges.6
This Article examines the 1995 revision of the Air Pollution
Prevention and Control Law (the 1995 APPCL). The struggles
attending that revision warrant our attention not only because of the
gravity of China's air pollution, but for the revealing window they
provide onto Chinese legislative development more generally.
Through it, we can better understand the inner workings of what is,
under the Chinese constitution, the supreme organ of the state, the
1. Chris P. Nielsen & Michael B. McElroy, Introduction and Overview to
ENERGIZING CHINA: RECONCILING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH 11 (Michael B. McElroy et al. eds., 1998).
2. THE WORLD BANK, CLEAR WATER, BLUE SKIES: CHINA'S ENVIRONMENT IN
THE NEW CENTURY 23 (1997).
3. ENERGIZING CHINA, supra note 1, at 12.
4. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Daqi Wuran Fangzhi Fa [The Air Pollution
Prevention and Control Law of the People's Republic of China] (adopted Sept. 5, 1987,
effective June 1, 1988, amended Aug. 29, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 APPCL], reprinted in
ZHONGGUO HUANJING BAOHU FAGUI QUANSHU (1982-1997) [THE COMPLETE BOOK
OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF CHINA 1982-1997]
(Guojia Huanjing Baohu Ju Zhengce Fagui Si [The Policy Law and Regulation Division of
the National Environmental Protection Agency] ed., 1997) [hereinafter FAGUI
QUANSHU].
5. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Daqi Wuran Fangzhi Fa [The Air Pollution
Prevention and Control Law of the People's Republic of China] (enacted Apr. 29, 2000,
effective Sept. 1, 2000) [hereinafter 2000 APPCL].
6. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COALJDIRTY AIR: OR
How THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-
SULPHUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT 3,117 (1981).
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National People's Congress (NPC); the interface of the NPC with
other organs of state, national, and sub-national; and ultimately, the
relationship of the Chinese state to its people. This has much to tell
us about the particular limitations that prevented the 1995 APPCL
from achieving more, the difficulties confronting overall efforts to
deploy law to improve the Chinese environment, the growing
politicization of environmental matters, and the challenges that the
Chinese state faces as it attempts both to represent popular interest in
more transparent governmental institutions and also to deepen its
engagement in the international community as it prepares to accede
to the World Trade Organization.
Since the principal research for this Article was completed,
China has yet again amended its air pollution law. The Air Pollution
Prevention and Control Law of the People's Republic of China, as
amended in April 2000 (the 2000 APPCL) makes major changes in
the 1995 law, reflecting perhaps the weaknesses in that law, the
worsening environmental situation in China, and a growing
governmental awareness of the need to combat such problems. A full
consideration of the 2000 revisions is beyond the scope of this Article,
but a brief examination of those revisions illuminates the interplay
between institutional growth and enduring constraints that mark the
contemporary Chinese legal and political scene.
This Article commences in Part I by introducing law-making in
China before reconstructing the drafting process and attendant
political battles leading up to the revision of China's principal air
pollution law in 1995-which, as Ackerman and Hassler observed
with reference to the United States, can be every bit as messy as the
soiled air such efforts are intended to address. Part II then examines
the institutional factors that ultimately are critical to an
understanding of why the 1995 APPCL, as promulgated, fell well
short of its original authors' objectives but set in motion a process
that over time has led to the realization of at least some of these
legislative goals through the 2000 APPCL. The Article concludes by
suggesting the implications of these institutional considerations for
environmental law and legislative development more generally in the
PRC.
Beijing of the 1990s was hardly Washington of the late 1960s and
early 1970s, even if each was marked by earnest political and
philosophical battles over the best ways in which to address problems
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of air pollution through law. This Part commences with a short
introduction to the formal structure for law-making in China and a
brief overview of China's first air pollution law, the Air Pollution
Prevention and Control Law of 1987 (the 1987 APPCL),7 by way of
providing background for a consideration of the struggle over air
pollution law of the mid-1990s. That struggle, in turn, provides a
foundation for the treatment in Part II of the ways in which
institutional design has influenced and is likely further to shape the
law's role in the battle over air quality in China.
A. The Organs of State
(1) In General
The 1982 Constitution of the PRC provides that the NPC is
China's highest organ of state power.8 The NPC's powers include the
authority to enact all "basic laws" (jiben fa), to supervise the
implementation of such laws, and to make amendments to the
Constitution.9 The full NPC meets only once a year, however,10 for
approximately three weeks, and most law-making activity is instead
conducted by its Standing Committee. The roughly 155-member
Standing Committee meets bi-monthly," and is authorized to
7. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Daqi Wuran Fangzhi Fa [The Air Pollution
Prevention and Control Law of the People's Republic of China] (adopted Sept. 5, 1987,
effective June 1, 1988) [hereinafter 1987 APPCL], reprinted in FAGUI QUANSHU, supra
note 4, at 21.
8. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa [Constitution of the People's Republic of
China] art. 57 (1982) [hereinafter Constitution], reprinted in ZHONGHUA RENMIN
GONGHEGUO XINGZHENG FAGUI XUANBIAN [A SELECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATION
REGULATIONS AND LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 1 (Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Sifa Bu & Guowuyuan Fazhi Ju [The Ministry of Justice of the People's
Republic of China & The State Council Bureau of Legislative Affairs] eds., (1990)
[hereinafter FAGUI XUANBIAN]. The NPC includes approximately 3,000 deputies,
representing China's provinces, autonomous regions, and centrally administered
municipalities. See id. art. 59; Murray Scot Tanner, Organizations and Politics in China's
Post-Mao Law-Making System, in DOMESTIC LAW REFORMS IN POST-MAO CHINA 90
n.5 (Pitman B. Potter ed., 1994).
9. Constitution, supra note 8, art. 62. The term "basic law" is not defined. See
Tanner, supra note 8, at 59; cf. Perry Keller, Legislation in the People's Republic of China,
23 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REv. 653, 661 (1989) (stating that although "basic law" is not
defined in China's constitution, the term "does not often present a practical problem," as
"[i]t is generally accepted as referring to statutes... which have a fundamental effect on
the whole of society"). The full NPC also has a range of other powers, notably the
appointment and removal of government leaders. Constitution, supra note 8, art. 62.
10. Constitution, supra note 8, art. 61.
11. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Zuzhi Fa [Organic Law
of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China] art. 29 (promulgated
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interpret the Constitution, pass laws (fa) other than basic laws which
are the domain of the full NPC, interpret laws, and supervise the
work of the other principal organs of government: the State Council,
the Central Military Commission, the Supreme People's Procurate,
and the Supreme People's Court.12 Despite the NPC's formal powers,
however, the Chinese Communist Party (Communist Party, Party or
CCP) has served as the ultimate arbiter of power in China. The
Party's influence over the NPC is expressed through a variety of
mechanisms, including most notably the Party Central Committee's
role in defining the overall legislative agenda, and vetting key pieces
of legislation, and the fact that virtually all'NPC leaders-and most
delegates-are Party members or selected from a list approved by the
Party.13
The Constitution also provides for the establishment of
specialized committees to facilitate the NPC's work.14 Nine such
committees are currently in existence.15 Day-to-day work of the
Standing Committee is managed by the Standing Committee's
Dec. 10, 1982) [hereinafter 1982 Organic Law], reprinted in FAGUI XUANBIAN, supra note
8, at 58.
12. Constitution, supra note 8, art. 67. The Standing Committee also has the power,
inter alia, to review local laws and regulations that contravene the Constitution or national
laws, to appoint a range of officials, and to enact treaties. Id.
13. Tanner, supra note 8, at 60-65.
14. Constitution, supra note 8, art. 70.
15. The Constitution provides for the establishment of specialized committees in eight
areas, but also states that the NPC may establish additional committees as necessary. Id.
The eight subject areas the Constitution lists are nationalities, law, finance and economy,
education, science, culture and public health, foreign affairs, and overseas Chinese affairs.
Id. Pursuant to the Constitution, the NPC established six committees, grouping
Education, Science, Culture and Public Health into a single committee. Tanner, supra
note 8, at 84. The Internal and Judicial Affairs Committee was established in 1988, the
Environmental Protection Committee was established in 1993, and the Committee on
Agricultural and Rural Affairs was established in 1998. 1& at 81. The Committee on
Environmental Protection was renamed the Environment and Natural Resources
Protection Committee (ENRPC) in 1994.
The committees are designed to draft and discuss legislation for consideration by the
NPC and the NPC Standing Committee. Id. The powers of the committees, which
generally have some two dozen members (many drawn from the Standing Committee) and
one to two dozen staffers, include submitting legislation to the Standing Committee,
considering proposals referred to the committees by the Standing Committee, and
reviewing the legality of regulations issued by government ministries and commissions.
1982 Organic Law, supra note 11, art. 37.
In addition to the nine specialized committees, a tenth-the Committee on
Legislative Affairs (Fazhi Gongzuo Weiyuanhui) (CLA)-works directly for the Standing
Committee, reviewing all laws submitted to the NPC or the Standing Committee. The
CLA, which has a staff of over 200, is not to be confused with the specialized Committee
on Law (Falu Weiyuanhui), whose area of responsibility is the legal system.
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Chairman's Group, which includes the chairman and vice-chairmen of
the Standing Committee as well as the chairs of the special
committees.16
Although the NPC and its Standing Committee are responsible
for the passage of all national laws, other government authorities also
enjoy a wide range of law-making power,17 as will be considered at
greater length in Part III below. The State Council, China's chief
administrative and executive body,18 is authorized both to enact
administrative measures, rules, regulations, and decisions pursuant to
national laws and the Constitution, and to submit legislative proposals
to the NPC.' 9 The various ministries and commissions under the
State Council also are authorized to issue orders, rules, and
directives-which in China's complex hierarchy of legal norms occupy
a less prominent place than enactments of the State Council itself.20
People's congresses at various levels of provincial and local
government also may enact a wide range of local regulations and
decisions, provided such regulations do not violate the Constitution,
national laws, or national administrative regulations and rules. In
addition, local governments and government departments are also
authorized to issue rules and regulations, provided they are not in
violation of the Constitution and the aforementioned national
measures. 2' Finally, China has a national judiciary, headed by a
16. Constitution, supra note 8, art. 68. The Chairman's Group drafts the agenda for
each Standing committee meeting, and decides whether proposals and laws submitted to
the Standing Committee should be referred to a specialized committee or considered by
the full Standing Committee. See 1982 Organic Law, supra note 11, art. 25. On the
evolution of the Standing Committee's power, see Tanner, supra note 8, at 79-80.
17. William P. Alford & Yuanyuan Shen, Limits of the Law in Addressing China's
Environmental Dilemma, 16 STAN. ENvTL. LJ. 125, 127-28 (1997) (noting that law in
China "emanates officially from no fewer than eleven sources").
18. Constitution, supra note 8, art. 86. "State Council" refers both to China's
cabinet-consisting of China's premier and most important ministers-and the variety of
ministries, bureaus, and commissions that constitute the central government. Tanner,
supra note 8, at 89 n.4.
19. Constitution, supra note 8, art. 89; see also Tanner, supra note 8, at 65 ("The State
Council... promulgates the majority of all national laws and regulations, without
submitting them to the NPC for consideration, and [has been] ... the key drafter of most
of the NPC-promulgated laws.").
20. Keller, supra note 9, at 671-72.
21. Constitution, supra note 8, art. 100. The quantity of local regulations is significant.
In the environmental area, for example, see DIFANG HuANJING BAOHU FAGUI
XUANBIAN [A SELECTION OF SUB-NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND
REGULATIONS] (Guojia Huanjing Baohu Zongju Zhengce Fagui Si [The Central Policy,
Law, and Regulation Division of the National Environmental Protection Agency] ed.,
1999) [hereinafter DIFANG FAGUI XUANBIAN].
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Supreme People's Court which itself is vested with extensive
interpretive powers."
(2) Concerning the Environment
Although the NPC is China's supreme state organ, the State
Council took the lead in establishing and upgrading official entities
concerned with the environment. The Environmental Protection
Bureau was the first such entity, formed in 1975 as a part of the
National Basic Construction Commission (Guojia jiben fianshe
weiyuanhui). Its role was supplanted in 1988 by the National
Environmental Protection Commission, the principal mission of
which was to "aid the [Bureau] in directly communicating with the
politically more powerful industrial ministries." 23 Four years later the
Bureau was renamed the National Environmental Policy Agency
(NEPA) and elevated to sub-ministry status with the right directly to
report to the State Council. And in 1998, NEPA was, in turn, given
full ministry rank and renamed the State Environmental Protection
Administration (SEPA) at a time when many ministries were being
closed or consolidated. 24 It has a staff of approximately 200 at the
national level.
The NPC did not form a separate committee under its Standing
Committee to address issues of the environment until 1993, at which
time the role of the NPC's committees more generally was
expanding.25 A year later the committee so formed was renamed the
Environment and Natural Resources Protection Committee
(ENRPC), reflecting its broadened authority.26 As of the time of the
debates discussed in this Article, it included approximately twenty
members, eleven of whom were Standing Committee members, and a
staff of approximately twenty-five.
22. Nanping Liu, OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT: JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION IN CHINA 49-51 (1997).
23. This history is traced in Abigail R. Jahiel, The Organization of the Environmental
Protection in China, 156 CHINA Q. 757, 769 (1998). See also ZHONGHUA RENMIN
GONGHEGUO ZHENGFU JIGOU WUSHI NIAN [FIFTY YEARS OF STATE ORGANS OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 140-41 (Guojia Xingzheng Xueyuan [The National
School of Administration] ed., 1991).
24. Guojia Huanjing Baohu Zongju Guapai [State Environmental Protection
Administration Puts Out Its Sign], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], Apr. 1,1998, at 5.
25. Zhang Hongiun & Richard J. Ferris Jr., Shaping an Environmental Protection
Regime for the New Century: Environmental Law and Policy in the People's Republic of
China, 6 ASIAN J. ENVTL. MGMT. 35, 41 (1998); BARBARA J. SINKULE & LEONARD
ORTOLANO, IMPLEMENTING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN CHINA 8 (1995).
26. SINKULE & ORTOLANO, supra note 25, at 6,24 n.2.
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This structure is replicated below the national level. All
provinces and many localities have environmental protection bureaus.
These bureaus, which together employ some 80,000 individuals, are
typically not funded by SEPA, but instead secure funding from the
local governments of which they are a part, that portion of discharge
fees assessed on polluters that they are allowed to retain (twenty
percent with the rest to be remitted for pollution abatement
purposes), and various consulting and other businesses they may
run.27 And most provincial people's congresses have established
environmental affairs committees. 28
B. Air Pollution
(1) In General
China has engaged in a broad range of environmental law-
making since it emerged from the Cultural Revolution and began to
transform its economy in 1978.29 The first generation of such laws
included the Environmental Protection Law (for Trial
Implementation) in 1979,30 the Marine Environmental Protection
Law in 1982,31 the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law and
the Forestry Law in 1984,32 the Grasslands Law in 1985,33 and the
27. Xiaoying Ma & Leonard Ortolano, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CHINA:
INSTITUTIONS, ENFORCEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE 22,63-64,84-85 (2000).
28. On provincial people's congresses, see Roderick MacFarquhar, Reports From The
Field. Provincial People's Congresses, 155 CHINA Q. 656 (1998).
29. Cf. Alford & Shen, supra note 17, at 126 ("China has promulgated an extensive
body of environmental law that is impressive in comparison to that of many other
developing nations."). China took some steps aimed at protecting the environment even
before 1978. China's 1954 Constitution provided that the environment belongs to the
public, and China enacted a scattering of measures in the 1950s and 1960s relating to
certain pollutants. Alford & Shen, supra note 17, at 129; Ma Xiangcong, Preliminary
Discussion on the Law of Environmental Protection, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 65-66 (Lester Ross & Mitchell A. Silk
eds., 1987).
30. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa [The Environmental Law in
the People's Republic of China] (promulgated for trial implementation on Sept. 13, 1979,
abrogated by implementation of the Environmental Protection Law of 1989, effective Dec.
26,1989).
31. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Haiyang Huanjing Baohu Fa [The Marine
Environmental Protection Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated Aug. 23,
1982, effective Mar. 1, 1983), reprinted in FAGUI QUANSHU, supra note 4, at 6.
32. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shui Wuran Fangzhi Fa [The Water Pollution
Prevention and Control Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated May 11,
1984, effective Nov. 1,1984), reprinted in FAGUI QUANSHU, supra note 4, at 12.
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1987 APPCL. Throughout the 1980s China also enacted numerous
regulations and decisions relating to environmental matters, including
air pollution.34
Commencing at the very end of the 1980s and into the 1990s,
China undertook a new effort to strengthen its environmental laws,35
revising this first generation of environmental statutes36 as well as
crafting new laws on solid waste,37 noise,38 and other environmental
issues and developing a range of national and local environmental
regulations.39 These measures were undertaken in part due to a
recognition that many of the earlier laws "were cast in terms of a
more planned economy and a more ordered society than existed by
the end of the first decade of post-Cultural Revolution reform. 40
(2) The 1987 Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law
The 1987 APPCL established a broad, but vague, framework for
the regulation of air pollution. The law consisted of just forty-one
articles, filling less than eight pages of text in Chinese, separated into
six chapters: General Provisions; Supervision and Management of
the Prevention and Control of Air Pollution; Prevention and Control
of Pollution from Soot; Prevention and Control of Pollution from
Waste Gas, Dust, and Odorous Substances; Legal Liability; and
Supplementary Provisions.41
The General Provisions set forth the basic policies behind the
law and the responsibilities of various government actors. Thus, for
example, Article 1 stated that, in addition to preventing air pollution,
33. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Caoyuan Fa [The Grasslands Law of the People's
Republic of China] (promulgated on June 18, 1985, effective Dec. 1, 1985), reprinted in
FAGUI QUANSHU, supra note 4, at 322.
34. Alford & Shen, supra note 17, at 129-30.
35. Lester Ross, "The East is Green"-Recent Developments in Environmental Law in
China, CHINA L. & PRAC., Sept. 1997, at 56.
36. See, e.g., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shui Wuran Fangzhi Fa [Water Pollution
Prevention and Control Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated May 15,
1996) [hereinafter Water Pollution Law], reprinted in FAGUI QUANSHU, supra note 4, at
14.
37. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guti Feiwu Wuran Huanjing Fangzhi Fa [Solid
Waste Pollution Prevention and Control Law of the People's Republic of China],
(promulgated Oct. 30,1995), reprinted in FAGUI QUANSHU, supra note 4, at 27.
38. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Zaosheng Wuran Fangzhi Fa [Noise
Pollution Prevention and Control Law of the People's Republic of China Law]
(promulgated Oct. 29,1996), reprinted in FAGUI QUANSHU, supra note 4, at 32.
39. See Ross, supra note 35, at 58 (listing recent legislative efforts to strengthen
environmental protection).
40. Alford & Shen, supra note 17, at 132.
41. See 1987 APPCL, supra note 7.
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the law was designed to protect the human and ecological
environment and human health and to promote "socialist
modernization." 42 Article 2 stated that both the State Council and
local governments were responsible for taking steps to protect against
air pollution,43 while Article 3 stated that environmental departments
were to coordinate air pollution prevention work.44 Articles 6 and 7
provided that NEPA would establish national environmental
standards for environmental quality and for pollutants, but also
indicated that sub-national units of government could enact standards
more stringent than those existing at the national level.45
Other provisions provided broad outlines as to how local
environmental bureaus should enforce air quality standards. The law
required new construction projects to include projected impacts on
air quality in their environmental impact statements,46 provided for
fees to be assessed against enterprises or institutions exceeding air
pollution standards,47 and gave environmental bureaus the power to
conduct on-site inspections of polluters.48 It also called for standards
to be issued governing soot discharge and waste gas emissions, and
barred the burning of certain materials in densely inhabited areas,
absent approval by the local environmental protection department. 49
The law's provisions on legal liability provided for warnings or
fines against violators.50 In cases in which an environmental authority
had imposed administrative sanctions on a polluter, the law permitted
the affected party to challenge the sanctions in court.5' The law
allowed environmental protection departments to settle disputes
regarding liability resulting from harm caused by air pollution, while
also permitting affected parties to file suit.52 Finally, it also provided
for criminal sanctions to be imposed in cases of serious harm caused
by air pollution.5 3
42. Id. art. 1.
43. Id. art. 2.
44. Id. art. 3.
45. Id. arts. 6,7.
46. Id. art. 19.
47. Id. art. 11.
48. Id. art. 15.
49. Id. arts. 17, 22-25, 28. Such materials included asphalt, rubber, plastics, and the
like.
50. Id. art. 39.
51. Id. art. 35.
52. Id. art. 36.
53. Id. art. 38.
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C. Revising the APPCL
(1) Advocates of Revision
For observers inclined to see the NPC as little more than a
"rubber stamp," the controversy surrounding efforts during the mid-
1990s to revise China's principal air pollution law would seem to
suggest, at a minimum, a stamp of rather considerable complexity-
with divisions not only between advocates and opponents of revision,
but also within each of these camps, at least as to tactics.
The principal governmental advocates for the mid-1990s revision
of the 1987 APPCL were the ENRPC of the NPC and NEPA.54 Both
were convinced that China's existing air quality law was inadequate to
the task. By the mid-1990s, total suspended particulates and sulphur
dioxide in Beijing, Shanghai and other principal Chinese cities
exceeded World Health Organization standards and even the norm in
such other notoriously polluted Asian cities as Bangkok by as much
as six-fold, resulting, according to one World Bank study based on
1995 data, in 178,000 premature deaths, 346,000 pollution-related
respiratory hospital admissions, and millions of days of work lost per
annum in urban China.55 Nor were such problems limited to city
dwellers, with acid rain damaging an estimated quarter of vegetable
production in parts of Sichuan in 1993 and said to cause more than 13
billion dollars a year in damage across China.56 Moreover, although
national data seemed to indicate that particulate discharges were
stabilizing by the middle of the decade, the same sources suggested
that aggregate sulphur dioxide emissions were increasing more
rapidly than coal use, raising concerns about the effectiveness of
abatement procedures that the 1987 APPCL was, at least in theory,
intended to support.57  And the prospects for these problems
continuing were great, with energy demand increasing, coal remaining
constant at roughly three-quarters of primary energy consumption,
and the national motor vehicle fleet growing more than three-fold
during the decade ending in 1995.58
Advocates of substantially overhauling the 1987 APPCL
contended that it was not only vague and unclear, but also was the
54. Interview with Official A (1996); Interview with Official D (1996); Interview with
Academic U (1996).
55. CLEAR WATER, BLUE SKIES, supra note 2, at 6, 19. See also VACLAV SMIL,
CHINA'S ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS (1993).
56. CLEAR WATER, BLUE SKIES, supra note 2, at 22.
57. Id. at 8.
58. Id. at 45, 50, 74.
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product of a different, era, marked by appreciably greater state
control-with the result that it was premised on a set of societal
circumstances that no longer necessarily obtained, at least to the same
degree.59 This was evident economically in the 1987 APPCL's
assumption that the state would continue to be heavily involved in
industrial planning and its concomitant focus on two types of actors-
enterprises with some measure of state ownership and individuals-
leaving uncertain its application to the rapidly proliferating (and, in
some instances, heavily polluting) categories of non-state enterprises
and private businesses.60 Socially, -the law took for granted the
continued viability of the danwei system, pursuant to which each
citizen belonged to a unit that, at least in theory, tightly monitored his
or her behavior, even though by the 1990s, China (by official
estimates) had a "floating population" living beyond danwei control
of perhaps more than 100 million.61 And, in terms of administration,
the law presumed both a continued shared sense of national interest,
as defined by the state, and a continued capacity of the central
government to exert control over sub-national governmental actors
that did not necessarily take full account of the growing pluralization
of interests in society and the devolution of power from the center.
Beyond any such deficiencies, at least some in the ENRPC and
NEPA argued that China's growing engagement with the
international community in the years following the original air
pollution law's development provided further rationale for its
revision. Accession to the Montreal Protocol on Ozone Layer
Depleting Substances carried with it international legal obligations
(even if deferred for a decade) that would require revision of the 1987
APPCL, while accession in the Vienna Convention for Protection of
the Ozone Layer and The Framework Convention on Climate
Change (which China was the first major state to ratify) together with
Beijing's role in the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development and other international environmental fora suggested
that there would be costs in terms of reputational capital to pay for a
59. See Guanyu "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Daqi Wuran Fangzhi Fa" (Xiuding
Zhengqiu Yijian Gao) de Shuoming [Explanation Regarding the "People's Republic of
China Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law" (Revision Draft for Comment)], at 20-
21 [hereinafter ENRPC Explanation].
60. See Alford & Shen, supra note 17, at 132.
61. DOROTHY J. SOLINGER, CONTESTING CITIZENSHIP IN URBAN CHINA: PEASANT
MIGRANTS, THE STATE AND THE LOGIC OF THE MARKET 17-23 (1999).
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laggard air quality regime.62 Foreign engagement had also, it was
suggested, provided China with unprecedented exposure to the legal,
technological, and other knowledge said to underlie successful
environmental policy in developed market economy nations, while
increasing the likelihood that China could obtain sophisticated air
monitoring equipment abroad (or at least the technology therefor)
that might facilitate enforcement of more stringent discharge
requirements. 63
Central government entities with an explicit environmental
mandate were not the only proponents of substantially revising the
1987 APPCL. Elsewhere in national governmental circles, support
came, in varying degrees, from offices and officials with responsibility
for public health, foreign affairs, and technological development.64
Beyond the "Ring Roads" (the Chinese capital's counterpart to the
Beltway), a number of important provincial level governments,
including most notably those of Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, were
supportive of more stringent environmental regulations. These
jurisdictions were experiencing both the salutary and baleful effects
that wealth might have on the environment (i.e., a growing middle
class with keener concern for environmental affairs juxtaposed with
soaring increases in automobile use) while also chafing at the
dilemma posed by the relatively lax standards and even laxer
enforcement of China's national body of environmental legislation.65
The 1987 APPCL, to be sure, authorized sub-national units of
government to promulgate tougher local requirements (which, in
some instances included innovative measures that laid the
groundwork for subsequent efforts to improve the legal framework
for air quality at the national level), but that seeming discretion was,
to some extent, undermined by the problem of air pollution
generated by distant sources, and the possibility that some industries
might take advantage of growing autonomy from the state to migrate
from more to less environmentally restrictive locales.
The ENRPC, NEPA, and other proponents of revising the air
quality law also sought to enlist support beyond officialdom as such,
the line between state and society being rather less distinct in the
62. ENRPC Explanation, supra note 59, at 15. See also Lester Ross, China:
Environmental Protection, Domestic Policy Trends, Patterns of Participation in Regimes
and Compliance with International Norms, 156 CHINA Q. 809, 809-10, 813-15 (1998).
63. Interview with Official A (1997).
64. Interview with Official A (2001).
65. Interview with Academic A (1999).
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PRC than in liberal democracies. 66 In-house media such as the
Zhongguo Huanjing Bao (China Environmental Newspaper) and
others linked to the pertinent agencies stepped up their coverage of
the problems engendered by air pollution-with some, but by no
means all, of the more important stories reaching more general
publications. "Non-governmental" organizations and relevant
academics were encouraged to give voice to their general concerns
about the environment. And referencing a growing volume of citizen
complaints, the ENRPC endeavored to make the case that the "voice
of the masses" indicated support for tighter pollution controls
through law.67
(2) Drafting Revisions
Advocates of revising the air pollution law recognized that they
were likely to encounter stern opposition from an array of politically
powerful actors, including the State Planning Commission, the State
Economic Commission, some industrial ministries, provincial
governments in Sichuan, Guizhou, Gansu and elsewhere associated
with "dirty," (i.e., high-sulphur coal), and others.68 Accordingly, the
ENRPC and allies endeavored from the outset to move swiftly and
discreetly, taking advantage in particular of the NPC's attempts in
1993 (at the start of its eighth session) to assert itself relative to the
State Council by developing its own formal legislative plan and
preparing more of its own laws, rather than principally reacting to
initiatives and drafts from the State Council's Bureau of Legislative
Affairs (BLA).69  Acting before opponents could effectively
mobilize, 70 the ENRPC succeeded in persuading the NPC's
institutional leadership to include a revised air pollution law among
the 100 proposals selected from more than 500 put forward for
inclusion in the plan's so-called "first tier" (i.e., laws that the Standing
Committee plans to consider during the NPC's term, as distinct from
a second tier that it might address, time permitting, and those not
deemed worthy of inclusion in the plan).71
66. Tony Saich, Negotiating the State: The Development of Social Organizations in
China, 161 CHINA Q. 124 (2000).
67. ENRPC Explanation, supra note 59, at 21.
68. Interview with Academic K (1996); Interview with Official F (1996).
69. This change in the NPC's role is described in Michael W. Dowdle, The
Constitutional Development and Operations of the National People's Congress, 11 COLUM.
J. ASIAN L. 1 (1997).
70. See Interview with Official F, supra note 68. These objections were, however,
slight when compared to later objections to the substance of the proposed law. Id.
71. Dowdle, supra note 69, at 60.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52
In deciding in March 1994 to revise the law, the NPC's Standing
Committee delegated responsibility for its drafting to the ENRPC.
Recognizing the importance of demonstrating an ability to work with
sympathetic forces in the State Council hierarchy, the ENRPC looked
for initial legislative drafting to NEPA which, in turn, formed a
drafting group comprised chiefly of NEPA officials and academic
specialists in environmental law drawn from Wuhan University and
leading schools in Beijing 2 With some solicitation of views from
environmental officialdom both at the national and sub-national
levels, this drafting group soon produced a proposed revised air
pollution law.73
Although responsible for the decision to have NEPA undertake
the initial drafting work, the ENRPC was less than fully satisfied with
its results, viewing the draft as too accommodating to industrial
interests substantively and too imprecise technically.7 4 Believing that
a stronger draft law would put it in a better position to bargain with
opponents, the ENRPC rewrote important parts of the NEPA draft,
strengthening provisions designed to control acid rain, adding articles
regarding the control of nitrogen oxide emissions, toughening
sanctions, and sharpening legislative language.75 With the second
draft in hand, the ENRPC then began the arduous process of
soliciting the views of the BLA, affected ministries and commissions
and the standing committees of the people's congresses of each
province and centrally administered municipality. 6 Not surprisingly,
many of the solicited agencies, including, in particular, the electricity
72. Interview with Official F, supra note 68; Interview with Academic K, supra note
68.
73. At least some provincial environmental bureaus sent the draft law to county and
municipal environmental bureaus under their jurisdiction for comments; the provincial
bureaus then passed such comments on to NEPA. Interview with Official R (1996).
74. See Interview with Official A (1997), supra note 63.
75. See Interview with Official F, supra note 68. Objections to the NEPA draft came
in particular from ENRPC members with significant experience in environmental
protection who wanted much more stringent provisions. Id. However, NEPA officials
also apparently left some provisions out of the original draft because they felt inclusion of
such provisions would be futile. See Interview with Official I (1996). The substance of
other changes suggested by ENRPC and NEPA is discussed infra text accompanying notes
118-158.
76. Interview with Official F, supra note 68. In addition, an informal meeting was
held in Beidaihe (the summer resort at which senior officialdom vacations) with
representatives of the ENRPC, the Legislative Affairs Bureau of the State Council, and
representatives of the NPC's Commission on Legal Affairs. Persons attending the
meeting did so in their individual capacities, not as representatives of their respective
departments. Interview with Official W (1996).
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and coal ministries, voiced strong objections. 77 In addition, the NPC's
powerful Commission on Legislative Affairs (CLA), a body directly
under the Standing Committee responsible both for drafting laws for
the Standing Committee and for reviewing laws proposed by other
actors (including the NPC specialized committees), expressed its
serious concerns.78
(3) Debate and Retreat: The Controversy over Proposed Revisions
Notwithstanding the resistance its soundings evoked, the
ENRPC decided in October of 1994 to submit its initial draft to the
NPC Standing Committee with little change, fearing that
incorporating points raised by opponents would unduly weaken the
law.79 The draft immediately ran into fierce opposition, principally
taking the form of objections mirroring those made that had been
articulated earlier in the process.80 In the face of this controversy, the
Standing Committee called on the CLA to collect the views of central
government departments and ministries, sub-national government,
industry, and scholars.81 The CLA, in turn, primarily solicited the
views of the law's opponents, on the grounds that the ENRPC chiefly
represented the perspective of its supporters.82 The ENRPC, to be
sure, had sought the views of some of the law's opponents, but it had
done so only after developing its own draft and with less than a fully
open mind, suggested the CLA. Indeed, in carrying out this inquiry,
the CLA was mindful of the fact that the ENRPC had not gone out of
its way to elicit and heed the CLA's advice prior to developing the
aforementioned draft. Concurrently with the CLA's inquiry, the
BLA, which was no less concerned with maintaining its bureaucratic
prerogatives, undertook to solicit views from pertinent State Council
ministries for eventual transmission to the CLA.83
(4) Issues of Contention
Although the ENRPC's draft contained revisions to a majority of
articles in the 1987 APPCL, five proposed changes emerged as the
most contentious. Two centered chiefly around traditional sectoral
interests-coal and automobiles- also having strong regional
77. Interview with Official F, supra note 68.
78. Id.; Interview with Official A (1997), supra note 63.
79. Interview with Official A (1996), supra note 54.
80. Id.
81. Interview with Official W, supra note 76.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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implications, while the remaining three-concerning the system of
emission fees, total loading, and the division of urban areas into three
distinct zones-additionally raised what might be described as
broader philosophical issues.
A considerable portion of the coal China produces presents
serious environmental problems.84 Much of it mined in the politically
important province of Sichuan (with a population roughly the size of
Germany's) and other parts of southwestern China has a sulphur
content of some five percent 85 (as compared with one percent or less
for internationally traded steam coal or four percent for the "dirty
coal" that seized Ackerman and Hassler's attention)86 while coal
extracted from throughout the nation has an average ash content said
to be double that of its internationally traded steam counterpart.s7
China's continuing reliance on "inefficient coking plants and
industrial boilers,.., small boilers that fuel local industries, service
establishments and housing estates ... [and] even less efficient
household stores," in turn, exacerbates the problems of acid rain and
respiratory disease that these high-sulphur and high-ash coals,
respectively, present.88
Coal washing has the potential to reduce both sulphur and ash
emissions. Given that less than ten percent of China's steam coal was
being washed as of 1995,89 the ENR.PC draft called on Chinese mines
producing high-sulphur coal to install washing mechanisms by a
specified date or close down.90 Not surprisingly, the ENRPC's
mandatory washing proposal met with strenuous opposition from the
Ministry of Coal at the national level,91 as well as from representatives
of Sichuan and other areas likely to be affected.92 Mandatory
washing, argued the Ministry, would be enormously expensive,
particularly in view of the fact that the government required that coal
sold to power plants (typically from larger state-controlled mines) be
84. Vaclav Smil, China's Energy and Resources Uses: Continuity and Change, 156
CHINA Q. 935,937-42 (1998).
85. Id at 941.
86. Ackerman, supra note 6, at 19.
87. Id.
88. Smil, supra note 84, at 940-41.
89. Elspeth Thompson, Reforming China's Coal Industry, 147 CHINA Q. 726, 730
(1996).
90. See ENRPC Explanation, supra note 59, art. 30. Although the 1995 APPCL
significantly tightened regulations on high-sulphur coal, it did not explicitly state that
mines failing to comply would be shut. 1995 APPCL supra note 4, art. 24.
91. Interview with Official F, supra note 68.
92 Id.; see also Interview with Official W, supra note 76.
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priced some 20 yuan (approximately US$2.40 at the time) per ton
below market rates in order to keep electricity prices low.93 Such a
mandate, regional authorities contended, might ultimately force
closures, particularly among the 80,000 smaller mines that tended to
deal even more frequently in raw (i.e., unwashed) coal than larger
state mines.94 This, it was further suggested, would result in massive
unemployment in what were already hardscrabble areas, carrying
with it the possibility of social unrest.95 There were, to be sure, those
within the Ministry who thought that mandatory washing might
justify higher coal prices (as well as cleaner air), with support also
coming from representatives of regions producing low-sulphur coal
(such as Shanxi) or suffering from acid rain, but, in the end, they were
unable to carry the day.96 The final version of the law required that
mines extracting coal with a high-sulphur or high-ash content include
washing and drying facilities, but left it to the State Council to set a
deadline for their establishment, even as the law called for limiting
the mining of dirty coal and the popularizing of coal washing 7
The ENRPC's draft also aroused the ire of the automobile
industry, as well as some major industrial users of automobiles, in its
attempts to address the emissions problem engendered by China's
burgeoning reliance on cars.98 Specifically, the draft: (1) called for
stringent inspections for all new autos to ensure compliance with
national standards; (2) authorized a prohibition on the importation or
sale of cars not meeting such standards; (3) strengthened the position
of the local environmental bureaus charged with enforcing such
standards by requiring other governmental agencies to work more
closely with them; and (4) provided that relevant governmental
departments develop plans to encourage the substitution of unleaded
gasoline for leaded.99 With the exception of the last provision, which
won the backing of major state refiners who thought they could use a
mandated switch-over to push smaller competitors out of business'00
and also enjoyed a measure of support in advanced urban centers
93. Interview with Official F, supra note 68.
94. Id.; Interview with Official A (1999).
95. 1&
96. Interview with Official F, supra note 68.. Such views were rejected due to
uncertainty regarding the funding needed for clean technology, as well as concern by Coal
Ministry officials that if they did accede to this, small producers of coal might be able to
evade such requirements and undersell their product with untreated coal.
97. 1995 APPCL, supra note 4, art. 4.
98. Interview with Official D (1996), supra note 54.
99. ENRPC Explanation, supra note 59.
100. Interview with Academic AA (1996).
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such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, all these proposals were
defeated. The principal rationale offered was that the costs of
implementation far outweighed any environmental benefits to be
derived, at least in the minds of those who believed they would bear
such expenses.1 1
Opponents of the other three major proposals of the ENRPC
draft that engendered serious controversy cited cost, but, additionally,
framed their opposition along broader lines. The ENRPC draft, for
instance, sought to strengthen the emissions permit and fee systems
by mandating that those who would emit pollution secure a permit
prior to commencing such activity, by requiring polluters to pay
emission fees on their entire volume of emissions (as opposed to only
that portion in excess of permitted levels, as was the case under the
1987 APPCL), and by explicitly declaring emissions in excess of levels
authorized by said permits to be illegal. With modest experiments
underway in some locales and with the example of many foreign
jurisdictions in mind, the ENRPC and NEPA were convinced that
movement toward a vibrant permitting system was critical.1 2 Fees
were warranted even for pollution within permitted levels, contended
the ENRPC, to mirror the fact that such emissions placed a strain on
national resources (and, as well, to reflect what was understood to be
international best practice).10 3 And, it was vital, advocates of the
draft argued, that excessive emissions be deemed illegal in order to
lend gravity to calls for a cleaner environment and to strengthen the
hand of local environmental officialdom. 1 4
Each of the foregoing measures evoked strong opposition, but
the sharpest condemnation was directed at the attempt to label
excessive emissions illegal. Fee levels for excessive emissions had
been established in the early 1980s, at a time when much of the
Chinese economy was still under relatively strong state control, and
had not been changed since,10 5 both because of opposition from
heavily polluting industries and on-going disagreement between
environmental authorities (for whom such fees were a prime source
of operating revenues at the local level) and other governmental
101. Interview with Official D (1996), supra note 54.
102. Interview with Official A (1996), supra note 54; Interview with Official I, supra
note 75; Interview with Academic K, supra note 68.
103. ENRPC Explanation, supra note 59, at 26.
104. Interview with Official A (1999), supra note 94.
105. Zhengshou Paiwu Fei Zhanxing Banfa [Temporary Provisions for the Collection
of Emissions Fees] (promulgated Feb. 5, 1982), reprinted in FAGUI QUANSHU, supra note
4, at 11.
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agencies over the choice of the state agency that would derive any
new revenues. By the mid-1990s, these fees were typically artificially
low (running at a fifth of the cost of abatement), with the result that
many enterprises found it cheaper to pay them rather than stem
pollution, while in other instances environmental bureaus failed even
to collect fees for fear of alienating powerful industrial interests and
their local governmental patrons.1°6 The changes proposed by the
ENRPC, argued the CLA based on a report that some critics believed
was scientifically unfounded, would, in effect, result in the majority of
enterprises nationally being labeled as violators of the law.1°7 This,
the CLA suggested somewhat sharply, not only posed serious
implementation problems, but also ran the risk of insulting otherwise
law-abiding citizens and, so, impairing, rather than enhancing, respect
for the law.108 In consequence, the final version of the law retained
the 1987 APPCL formulation with little change.
The ENRPC draft's proposal that emissions be measured by
total load, rather than concentration, experienced much the same
treatment. At the time of the 1987 APPCL's revision, most pollution
control in China relied on measurements of the concentration of
pollutants in emissions, rather than the total load, even though such
measurements often did not produce an accurate reading of the
impact of pollution, given that pollutants might be diluted or released
slowly over time. 09 Building on experimentation in Jiangsu and
elsewhere at the sub-national level (principally concerning water
pollution), advocates in the ENRPC, buttressed by sympathetic
scholars, argued that total loading was essential if pollution was
accurately to be measured and, therefore, was an indispensable
element of any effective air quality law."0
106. Interview with Official A (1996), supra note 54; Interview with Academic T (1996).
One reason fee standards were not changed is apparently that other government
departments were willing to accede to it only if they, not NEPA, collected the fees. NEPA
feared losing an important revenue stream for environmental protection, and thus,
changes of consequence were not made. See Interview with Academic T, supra. See also
SINKULE & ORTOLANO, supra note 25.
107. Interview with Academic U, supra note 54; Interview with Academic AA, supra
note 100.
108. Interview with Academic AA, supra note 100. The report stated, for example, that
seventy percent of all electrical plants in the regions surveyed would fail to meet emissions
standards. Id. Although some supporters of the provision agreed that the provision would
be problematic if such a high percentage of enterprises were actually deemed to be
operating illegally, they doubted the CLA's estimates. Id. Interview with Academic U,
supra note 54.
109. SINKULE & ORTOLANO, supra note 25, at 35-36.
110. Interview with Official U (1996); Interview with Academic Y (1996).
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Opponents of total loading, including the Ministry of Electricity
and the Ministry of Chemical Industry (speaking at times directly and
at times through the State Planning Commission and the State
Economic Commission) contended that it represented far too massive
and expensive a change, given both the cost of technology needed to
monitor emissions and, presumably, the cost of compliance with
tighter pollution controls that would result from the more accurate
measurements total loading would provide."' Where, it was asked,
would the funds needed come from and what would be the likely
impact of the proposed changes on economic development? Some
local officials, including persons in and beyond the environmental
protection bureaucracies, objected on the grounds that they neither
had nor foresaw obtaining the technology needed to meet the law's
requirements."2  Others contended that even if technologically
feasible, the high costs of total loading were simply unwarranted for a
nation at China's stage of economic development.113 In the end,
however, differences in opinion regarding total loading centered not
only around cost, but also on whether it was appropriate to include in
the law provisions that many felt were unattainable, at least in the
short- to mid-term." 4 As with the proposal to label excessive
emissions illegal, concern was voiced about the implications of setting
a standard that might result in a significant number of actors being
treated as violators of the law. And, so, the proposed change was
shelved.
The final major focal point of opposition to the ENRPC draft
emerged with respect to its proposal to divide China's municipalities
(which, in some instances, included considerable agricultural land)
into three categories for air pollution prevention and control
purposes." 5 Category 1 cities would be required to comply with the
most stringent standards for sulphur dioxide and particulates by the
end of 1998, cities in category 2 would in general be subject to less
stringent standards, and those in the third group would have been
permitted to meet yet lower standards through 1998, after which they
would be expected to comply with the standards provided for
category 2 cities." 6 Objections paralleled those voiced with respect to
111. Interview with Official F, supra note 68; Interview with Academic E (1996).
112. Interview with Academic AA, supra note 100.
113. Interview with Academic E, supra note 111.
114. Interview with Official W, supra note 76.
115. See ENRPC Explanation (regarding art. 19), supra note 59.
116. Id. Category I would have included centrally administered cities, provincial
capitals, important historical and tourist locales, and urban areas in special economic
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terming excessive emissions illegal and instituting total loading. The
costs of establishing such special zones, it was suggested, would be too
great. Implementation would be too difficult,117 notwithstanding the
success of Beijing, Shanghai, and other localities in taking advantage
of autonomy provided in the 1987 APPCL to put in place
requirements exceeding national minimums. And there was, once
again, a concern voiced about the damage to legal development of
promulgating requirements that, it was alleged, would not
consistently be observed.
Beyond the foregoing points of particular contention, the
ENRPC draft also included a number of other provisions that, had
they survived the Standing Committee's review, would have
significantly enhanced pollution controls and the role of local
environmental bureaus. One would have strengthened
environmental impact assessments by expanding the areas for which
such reports are required, requiring assessments to take account of
the views of the affected public, fining those who submit false or
seriously inaccurate environmental impact assessments, and imposing
criminal liability in cases in which inaccurate environmental impact
assessments resulted in serious harm.1 8  Another would have
explicitly made local governments responsible for air pollution and
would have included specific provisions stating that each level of
government should dedicate funds to preventing air pollution
(without necessarily indicating where such funds were to be found)." 9
And yet another would have strengthened the position of local
environmental bureaus, by shifting authority to establish emissions
standards from local governments (which even in the revised law have
the authority to accept or reject recommendations from
environmental authorities to suspend or terminate operators of
polluting plants) to local environmental bureaus while also expanding
the range of conduct subject to fines. 20 As with so much else
proposed by the ENRPC, these also met with strenuous opposition.
zones. Id. Nationally designated scenic areas would also have been classified in the first
category. Id.
117. Id.; Interview with Academic U, supra note 54.
118. See ENRPC Explanation (regarding arts. 10 and 52), supra note 59. The PRC is
now preparing a law specifically reporting environmental impact assessments.
119. See id. art. 2.
120. See id. arts. 6-7, 48-56.
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(5) The Standing Committee's Decision
Despite the numerous objections its draft encountered, the
ENRPC initially was unwilling to compromise.12' The CLA similarly
refused to budge, and a protracted stalemate ensued.122 In the end,
however, the ENRPC apparently realized that it had little choice;
either it could negotiate concessions, or abandon plans for any
revisions. ENRPC officials accordingly negotiated a compromise
dealing principally with members of the CLA and the NPC's Law
Committee,123 enabling the Standing Committee to promulgate the
revised law.
As suggested above, the compromise eliminated the vast
majority of the ENRPC's key suggested revisions, leaving noteworthy
change in only four areas-clean production technology, the sulphur
content of coal, the establishment of acid rain control areas, and the
use of unleaded gasoline.
The revised law appeared to strengthen the regulation of
production technology. In addition to encouraging the use of clean
production technology, one of only nine new articles provided for the
phase-out of production processes and facilities that cause serious air
pollution. 2 4 The law stated that the State Council and "relevant
departments" shall issue a list of processes and facilities to be banned
within a specified period of time. It also stated that enterprises or
institutions using banned processes and facilities may be closed.
Although the impact of the definition of such processes and facilities
would obviously be crucial (and was to have been addressed in a
separate clean production law), the provision seems to have been an
effort to move toward tighter standards.
The law also suggested an attempt to strengthen regulation of
sulphur emissions. A new article called for coal washing and dressing
to be popularized and for limitations on the mining of high-sulphur
coal. The revised APPCL also included new provisions aimed toward
the reduction of pollution caused by the burning of coal in urban
areas.125 Additionally, the law stated that acid rain and sulphur
dioxide control areas could be established, in which industry would be
required to use low-sulphur coal or install technology designed to
121. Interview with Official A (1999), supra note 94.
122. Interview with Official F, supra note 68.
123. The Law Committee is one of the more specialized committees under the Standing
Committee of the NPC. See Dowdle, supra note 69, at 51-52 (discussing the work of the
Law Committee).
124. 1995 APPCL, supra note 4, art. 15.
125. Id. arts. 25, 26, 36.
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reduce emissions. 126 -Finally, the law took a small step toward
reducing auto emissions by calling on the state to foster use of
unleaded gasoline and by providing for the development of plans to
eliminate the use of lead. 127
Despite the apparent success of opponents of tightened
environmental standards, however, supporters of the ENRPC draft
on the Standing Committee did not submit quietly, but instead were
vocal in arguing that the final version of the law was too lenient
toward polluters.128  For example, during Standing Committee
discussions of the compromise draft, one member argued that
although the Standing Committee had asked for views on the law
from industry and polluters, the CLA had not solicited the views of
people concerned with the environment. Additionally, supporters of
the ENRPC draft argued that pursuant to national environmental
policy, and in particular Agenda 21, the state should be striving more
affirmatively to use law to protect the environment. 129 Others argued
that the law as revised would serve little use without setting specific
target dates for the elimination of the use of leaded gas and other
proposed changes. Critics also complained that provisions regarding
violators of its ban on certain processes and technologies delegated
the authority to impose penalties to governmental departments
"responsible for polluting industries," ignoring the fact that many
joint ventures and private industries do not have such supervisory
departments. And critics of the watered-down draft also argued that
the public health costs of the truncated legislation would be large. 30
Nonetheless, in the end, only a single member of the Standing
Committee voted against adoption of the revised law.'31
D. The Aftermath
There was, to be sure, widespread disappointment in the
ENRPC, NEPA, the environmental bureaucracy below the national
level, and among environmental scholars with the 1995 revisions.132
The debate over the APPCL revisions, however, might better be
126. Id. art. 24.
127. Id. art. 38.
128. Interview with AcademicT, supra note 106.
129. State Science and Technology Commission and State Planning Commission,
CHINA'S AGENDA 21-WHITE PAPER ON CHINA'S POPULATION, ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY (1994).
130. Id.
131. Interview with Official F, supra note 68.
132. See, e.g., Interview with Official R, supra note 73.
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thought of as representing one stage in an ongoing debate. Although
the law itself may not have met even limited expectations, the
discussions about it paved the way for subsequent consideration of
stricter environmental law and regulation. As is shown below, some
provisions explicitly rejected in the debate surrounding the 1995
APPCL nonetheless found their way into national and local legal
measures during the second half of the 1990s, culminating in the
revision of the APPCL itself in 2000.
(1) Implementing Regulations
One could think of the 1995 APPCL as one round in an ongoing
debate over air pollution standards. Both the general implementing
regulations, which were drafted but not issued, 133 and more specific
regulations on acid rain provisions,134 which were promulgated two
and a half years after the 1995 APPCL, created opportunities to
revisit struggles waged during the law's drafting. Notably, changes
rejected by the NPC's Standing Committee concerning pollution
permits, total loading, and controls on sulphur dioxide emissions
resurfaced during the preparation of the aforementioned sets of
regulations.' 35
As the lead agency overseeing environmental regulation under
the State Council, NEPA assumed responsibility for overseeing
drafting of overall implementing regulations, which it, in turn,
assigned to environmental officials in the Hebei provincial
government.136 In addition, groups of scholars were also formed to
help develop particular provisions: responsibility for drafting
regulations on acid rain, for example, was delegated to a group
including environmental scientists at Beijing's Qinghua University.
Concurrently, NEPA consulted with the Coal Ministry regarding
standards on the washing of high-sulphur coal. Additionally,
although the State Council's Economic and Trade Committee
undertook responsibility for drafting a list of those products to be
133. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Daqi Wuran Fangzhi Fa Shishi Xize Xiuzheng
An (Song Shen Gao) [People's Republic of China Air Pollution Prevention and Control
Law Implementing Regulations Draft Showing Revisions (Draft Submitted for
Consideration)] [hereinafter APPCL Draft Implementing Regulations]. Pending the
completion of these regulations, those promulgated in 1988 to implement the 1987 APPCL
remained legally effective.
134. Interview with Academic Z (1996); see also Geoffrey Murray, China Announces
Plan to Tackle Acid Rain Problem, KYODO NEWS SERV., Mar. 14, 1998, available at
LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
135. Interview with Official A (1999), supra note 94.
136. Interview with Official I, supra note 75.
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banned pursuant to thenew law, it did so in consultation with NEPA,
while NEPA itself began to draft regulations on automobile
emissions.137
Notwithstanding the suggestion of some officials that the vague
provisions of the 1995 APPCL itself made rapid revision of the
implementing regulations essential, the process of revising the
implementing regulations proceeded slowly, ultimately, at the
national level, yielding only a set of "detailed rules," the acid rain
provisions, and provisions restricting nitrogen oxide emissions.138
Although this pace may be due in part to changes in China's
leadership and to the restructuring of the State Council's ministries,
the delays also suggest that the effort encountered significant
opposition within high government circles. For example, NEPA
completed its draft of the regulations on acid rain in August 1996,139
but the State Council did not approve them until 1998.140 The failure
to pass implementing regulations may also have reflected a misguided
strategy by environmental advocates, for in some cases they were
seeking to include provisions explicitly rejected by the NPC Standing
Committee-and they were doing so at a time when there was
increased attention to the question of whether State Council rules and
regulations were in line with national laws.
The acid rain provisions are revealing. Having failed to secure
approval from the Standing Committee in 1995 for total loading,
NEPA made its inclusive acid rain regulations a prime goal.141 These
provisions create two control zones, covering areas that account for
sixty percent of China's sulphur dioxide emissions, and establish a
target date of 2000, by which time all industrial polluters within these
zones will be required to comply with national standards for sulphur
137. Id.
138. Ross, supra note 35, at 56. China has strengthened its ambient air quality
standards, setting standards for the emission of particles smaller than 10 microns, and
tightening standards on the emission of suspended particulates and nitrogen oxide. Id. at
56-57.
139. NEPA actually completed two drafts of the regulations, one with large areas
included as acid rain control areas and one with fewer areas so included. Drafters
anticipated that industry representatives would push for the smaller plan; however, some
opposed it because it would have divided certain provinces in half, with certain portions of
some provinces subject to stricter standards than other areas within the same province.
Interview with Academic Z, supra note 134.
140. See Guowuyuan Guanyu Suanyu Kongzhiqu He Erliang Hualiu Wuran Kongzhiqu
Yougan Wenti De Pifa [The Reply of the State Council with Regard to Acid Rain Control
Districts and Sulphur Control Districts], Jan. 12, 1998 [hereinafter Reply of the State
Council].
141. Interview with Official D (1996), supra note 54.
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dioxide emissions. 42 Existing mines are to be restricted in their
production of high-sulphur coal, and new mines that might extract
high-sulphur coal will be prohibited, while new coal-fired power
plants will not be permitted near major urban areas and existing
power plants will be required to install desulphurization technofogy.
In addition, a pollution permit system will operate to regulate
emissions and provide a basis for the collection of fees from sulphur
dioxide emitters in the two zones.143
The acid rain regulations thus contain many provisions originally
included in the ENRPC's draft 1995 APPCL concerning permits,
specific target dates, and bans on new mines. Although the limited
geographic area in which the regulations are being implemented may
reduce their effectiveness, the ability of NEPA to convince the State
Council to enact these provisions demonstrates that the NPC
Standing Committee's explicit rejection of certain provisions in
national laws does not necessarily bar their inclusion in regulations.
Additionally, the very presence of such provisions in the acid rain
provisions may make their acceptance in future revisions of the
APPCL easier. In effect, in the acid rain provisions,
environmentalists appear to have won back some of what they lost in
the 1995 APPCL itself.144
NEPA's success with the acid rain regulations came despite
opposition resembling that in the debate over the 1995 APPCL.
Affected industrial groups, which had often attempted to influence
NEPA, sought to do so with regard to these regulations. In addition,
representatives of local governments lobbied the group drafting the
acid rain provisions. Many feared that their jurisdictions might be
included in acid rain control areas, although some local
environmental bureaus lobbied for inclusion so as to strengthen their
own positions locally.145
The general implementing regulations initially appeared to be
following a similar path, with slow movement through the State
142. See Murray, supra note 134. The areas included in the control zone account for
just 11.4% of China's territory. Id. At the time of the completion of this Article, SEPA
was examining the degree to which compliance has been attained. Although many local
areas are reporting high compliance rates, the reliability of such reporting is unclear.
143. Id.
144. The procedure of assigning responsibility to drafters who then diverge somewhat
from the language of the original law is not uncommon. Tanner, supra note 8, at 70
(noting that "officials who draft [implementing] regulations can and often do use them to
alter or subvert the intentions of the original law's drafters"). It does not appear that the
ENRPC was involved in a consequential way in the drafting of the acid rain regulations.
145. Interview with Academic 1 (1996).
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Council apparatus but the belief in NEPA that the regulations would
eventually be approved. The draft of the regulations that NEPA
submitted to the State Council included a number of provisions
explicitly rejected in the NPC Standing Committee's debate over the
1995 APPCL. In particular, the draft regulations stated that all
provinces and directly administered cities shall formulate "total
loading plans" for air pollution.146  The draft regulations also
provided for the use of pollution permits, tightened restrictions on the
mining of high-sulphur coal, required the phasing-out of the use of
leaded gasoline, increased penalties for violations of the APPCL and
the implementing regulations, and expanded the jurisdiction of
national and local environmental authorities.147 In the end, however,
SEPA was unable to win approval of these regulations. Although the
inclusion of such provisions in the draft regulations demonstrated that
national environmental authorities did not consider themselves overly
constrained by the text of the 1995 APPCL, the failure to win
approval of the regulations suggests that this may have been a
mistake.148  Although persons involved in the drafting process
commented that they believed themselves bound by the law, they also
indicated their belief that they should draft the regulations in light of
laws passed and policy statements issued subsequent to the APPCL,
most notably in the former case the Water Pollution Law that has
provisions regarding permits, fines, and total loading that went well
beyond the 1995 APPCL, and in the latter, President Jiang Zemin's
July 1996 speech at China's National Conference on Environmental
Protection endorsing total loading.149 As will be demonstrated below,
the inclusion of such concepts may have ensured that even if the State
146. See APPCL Draft Implementing Regulations, supra note 133, art. 2; see also id. art.
7 (stating that districts that are unable to meet national emissions targets for air pollution
shall not create new polluting facilities or expand existing facilities, unless such emissions
are compensated for by reductions from other pollution sources, so as to ensure that the
total load of pollution in that district does not increase); id. art. 25 (providing for the use of
total loading measurements in acid rain control areas).
147. Id. arts. 5, 11, 19, 23, 31, 34-35.
148. To be sure, some persons involved in the drafting of the regulations questioned
how far the regulations could stray from the APPCL. For example, the drafters debated
whether provisions could be included regarding fines for excessive emissions, which would
effectively treat such excesses as illegal. Interview with Academic T, supra note 106. The
NPC Standing Committee had apparently specifically rejected the use of fines in this
context, deleting such provisions from the draft ENRPC submitted to the Standing
Committee. Some involved in the drafting of the implementing regulations believed that
they lacked the authority to include such provisions in the regulations. Others, however,
felt that such provisions should be included.
149. Interview with Official K (1996); Interview with Academic T, supra note 106.
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Council would not pass these regulations, the groundwork would be
laid for the 2000 revision of the APPCL.
(2) National Laws and Policies
In addition to laying the groundwork for later versions of the
APPCL itself, the ENRPC and NEPA also succeeded in
incorporating certain key principles represented by provisions deleted
from the 1995 APPCL into other laws, most notably the 1996 revision
of the Water Pollution Law, which explicitly provides for pollution to
be measured via total loading, and also provides for the use of
emissions permits.150 Additionally, the Water Pollution Law is the
first PRC law to mandate that environmental impact assessments
must take account of the views of affected members of the public
(although it does not guarantee public access to information, or
public participation at other stages of the approval process).151
To be sure, experiments in the use of permits and total loading
for water pollution were underway well before comparable local
efforts regarding air pollution. Also, technology to address water
pollution was both more readily available and appreciably cheaper
than for counterparts for air pollution. 152 Nevertheless, the inclusion
of provisions calling for total loading and permits suggests at least the
possibility that the debates over such issues in the context of revising
the APPCL may have made it easier to include such provisions in the
Water Pollution Law and vice versa.
Other policy statements and national regulations further
illustrate that principles suggested in ENRPC's draft of the 1995
APPCL have been winning more widespread acceptance. 53 Total
loading received a boost in July 1996 from Jiang Zemin's speech on
that topic. 54 The government's much-publicized effort to clean up
the enormously polluted Huai River included the promulgation of
150. See Water Pollution Law, supra note 36, art. 16.
151. See iL, art. 13; Ross, supra note 35, at 57.
152. The inclusion of fines for exceeding pollution limits may similarly have been due to
the unique context of water pollution. Provisions regarding the assessment of fines in the
Water Pollution Law were in part made possible by a compromise that permits the
Fisheries Ministry, rather than environmental bureaus, to collect fines. Interview with
Official F, supra note 68.
153. In addition to the laws and regulations discussed here, in 1996 China enacted a
Law on Coal that includes provisions stating that coal washing shall be encouraged. See
China Adopts Effective Measures to Control Pollution, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 14,
1996, available at LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File. The relationship of the law to
the APPCL is, however, unclear, and presents an additional avenue for further research.
154. Ross, supra note 35, at 56.
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targeted regulations containing provisions regarding total loading,
while China's 1996 Law on Coal (which is chiefly concerned with
production and marketing) provides at article 35 that the state "shall
encourage... coal washing" and at article 36 that it "shall develop
and disseminate clean coal technology." Officials also note that the
State Council's 1996 Decision on Seven Issues Concerning
Environmental Protection calls upon industrial polluters to comply
with local and national standards by the end of 2000.' Although
SEPA's review of compliance with standards is ongoing as this Article
is being concluded, environmental officials state that seventy percent
of enterprises have reached these targets-though even these overly
sanguine officials acknowledge that such figures may well be
inflated.156 Such targets, in any event, are significant in representing
the first time China "has set a specific date for compliance on such a
large scale."'1 57
(3) Local Regulations
The 1995 APPCL also provided the impetus for a number of
provinces and municipalities to revise their own environmental
standards. In some cases, sub-national entities have sought to do
locally what could not be accomplished nationally. For example,
Beijing revised its regulations, enacting provisions significantly
stricter than those in the 1995 APPCL. In particular, Beijing took
specific steps to tighten the control of automobile emissions, banning
the sale of unleaded gasoline, and tightening regulations on the use of
coal.158 Beijing also announced in 1998 that it would issue weekly
reports on the level of certain pollutants in the city's air.159 These
have proven so popular that the municipal government now issues
them daily. Although not directly linked to provisions in the APPCL,
the publication of such information is consistent with ENRPC's
155. Id.
156. Interview with Official A (2000); Interview with Official C (2000).
157. Ross, supra note 35, at 56.
158. Interview with Official H (1996); Interview with Official I, supra note 75. Other
cities, including Shenyang, Shanghai, and Hangzhou, took similar steps to tighten local
regulation of air pollution.
159. Ted Plafker, Beijing Coming Clean over Air, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 27, 1998, at
A15. Twenty-seven other Chinese cities already provide such information. Beijing Starts
Weekly Air Quality Reports, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Feb. 28, 1998, available at LEXIS,
World Library, ALLWLD File.
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attempts to increase public awareness of and participation in
environmental impact assessments.160
Local debates at times have mirrored those at the national level.
In Jiangsu, for example, the provincial environmental bureau first
undertook to draft provincial regulations on environmental
protection in 1992. An original draft of Jiangsu's regulations that
included provisions on total loading and on fines for polluters
generated strong opposition within the provincial people's congress.
After significant debate-and twelve revisions of the proposed
regulations-Jiangsu approved regulations that did not provide for
either total loading or fines for exceeding emissions levels.161
(4) A New APPCL
The most significant effect of the debates both over total loading,
permits, automobile emission standards, and other controversial
topics during consideration of the 1995 APPCL and over theimplementing regulations may have been in laying the groundwork
for future revisions to the APPCL itself. Indeed, the debates ensured
that by the end of the 1990s, such controversial proposals were no
longer new.
The decision to revise the 1995 law stemmed from two primary
factors. First, while officials in the ENRPC and NEPA had earlier
expressed the hope that the 1995 law would be made tougher via the
implementing regulations,162 by the late 1990s the implementing
regulations still had not been passed. In particular, NEPA had
originally sought to include provisions requiring total loading,
emissions permits, and tighter regulations regarding automobile
regulations in administrative regulations. Yet such provisions had
been explicitly rejected by the Standing Committee during
consideration of the 1995 law. Opponents of such provisions
apparently argued, cogently, that to include such provisions in State
Council regulations would be inconsistent with the 1995 APPCL.
SEPA and ENRPC officials felt that the 1995 APPCL provided too
low a base on which to draft regulations, and thus argued that the
APPCL itself should be revised.163
Second, significant support for a new law came from local
governments, in particular Beijing, which faced massive
160. Interview with Academic A, supra note 65; Interview with Official A (1999), supra
note 94.
161. Interview with Academic Y, supra note 110.
162. Interview with Official A (2000), supra note 156.
163. i&
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environmental problems but which felt that their ability to enact
tougher regulations was limited by the 1995 APPCL.164 Beijing had
sought to include provisions regarding total loading and emissions
permits in local regulations, but feared that doing so would be
inconsistent with the national law. Beijing originally sought
authorization (shou quan) to enact such regulations. ENRPC
officials, however, felt that this procedure was inappropriate,
particularly given the likelihood that other cities would face similar
problems in the future.165 The ENRPC itself spent a long year
considering whether weaknesses in the 1995 law could be cured either
through implementing regulations or by allowing local authorities to
enact tougher laws. In the end, the ENRPC concluded that neither
alternative was appropriate, and thus decided to seek revisions to the
law itself. Opponents argued against making changes to the law,
protesting that revising it a third time within thirteen years would
undermine its stability and erode public confidence in law more
generally.166 But the ENRPC apparently succeeded in convincing the
Standing Committee that a revised law was urgently needed.
Judged from the perspective of China's environmental
lawmakers, the 2000 APPCL167 is a significant success. The Standing
Committee enacted provisions that had been rejected during the
debates over the 1995 law, and used far more specific language than
had been included in the 1995 law. The law-making process itself was
also comparatively smooth, with the ENRPC generally winning the
support of the NPC's CLA.
The revised law includes a number of provisions that the ENRPC
sought, but failed to obtain, in the 1995 law. Article 3 of the 2000 law
explicitly calls on the use of total loading to measure pollution. 68 The
law also provides for the establishment of a national system for the
collection of emissions fees.169 Although the law leaves the details to
be worked out in State Council regulations, the establishment of such
a system would mark a major departure from the 1995 law, which
required that emissions fees be paid only by polluters whose
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 2000 APPCL, supra note 5. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Daqi Wuran Fangzhi
Fa [The Air Pollution Prevention and Control Laws of the People's Republic of China]
(enacted Apr. 29, 2000, effective Sept. 1, 2000).
168. Id. art. 3. The law also states that pollution density shall not exceed levels
provided for in national and local regulations.
169. Id. art. 14.
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emissions levels exceeded permitted levels. The law similarly
includes broad language calling for the establishment of total loading
districts and provides for the issuance of pollution permits in such
districts; again details are left to future State Council regulations.170
The new law also includes references to sustainable
development, 171 encourages the use of solar, wind, and hydro
power,'172 calls for increased use of clean energy sources,173 authorizes
key cities (zhongdian chengshi) to designate districts in which the use
and sale of polluting energy sources will be banned, 174 and includes
various provisions calling for the reduced use of heavily-polluting coal
and for the increased use of natural gas.175
The 2000 law also takes steps toward increasing public awareness
of environmental problems. Article 20 states that local governments
should inform the public of any dangerous environmental conditions
or pollution incidents.176 Article 23 calls on the governments of large-
and medium-sized cities to release environmental reports at fixed
intervals, including details of the types and potential harmful effects
of local pollutants.177  The 2000 APPCL likewise strengthens
regulation of automobile emissions, banning the sale, import, or
manufacture of automobiles that do not meet environmental
standards178 and barring the use of vehicles that fail to meet the
standards in effect at the time of their production. 179 It also includes
new provisions regarding emissions inspections' 80 and limits on the
sale of doped fuel.181
Finally, the 2000 law includes a range of new provisions
regarding sanctions to be imposed on non-complying polluters. These
include provisions granting county- or higher-level environmental
bureaus the power to impose fines up to RMB 100,000 on polluters
who exceed national or local emissions standards,182 and measures
170. Id. art. 15.
171. Id. art. 1.
172- Id. art. 9.
173. Id. art. 25.
174. Id.
175. Id. arts. 26, 28, 29. The law also includes new provisions calling on local
governments to increase and protect greenspace and establishes a rough outline for the
regulation of ozone-depleting substances.
176. Id. art. 20.
177. Id. art. 23.
178. Id. art. 32.
179. Id. art. 33.
180. Id. art. 35.
181. Id. art. 34.
182. Id. art. 48.
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permitting environmental departments to shut down non-complying
polluters,183 and impose fines of up to RMB 200,000 for excessive
sulphur dioxide emissions.184 The revised law also provides for the
imposition of criminal liability in egregious cases.185
Not all of the revisions sought by the ENRPC were incorporated
in the final law. Although ENRPC and SEPA officials state that all
of the principles that they sought to include in the law were in fact
incorporated in the final draft,186 certain specific provisions were
deleted during the Standing Committee's consideration of the law.
For example, the original ENRPC draft of the law included detailed
provisions regarding procedures for establishing both total loading
districts and a permit system; after opposition arose, the law reduced
these to a call for the creation of a national system for collecting
emissions fees.187 Opponents stated that if such provisions were
overly specific, they would be more likely to be incorrect; the NPC
thus agreed to leave detailed provisions for the State Council to
consider. ENRPC officials did not view this change as a major defeat,
stating that the State Council may indeed be able to do a better job of
fine tuning future regulations. 88 Given the State Council's failure to
enact implementing regulations for the 1995 law, such views appear to
be somewhat optimistic; at the very least, the failure to enact detailed
provisions regarding total loading and permits means that the actual
implementation of the corresponding provisions of the 2000 APPCL
will be delayed until regulations are enacted.
II.
As interesting as the sectoral and regional battles recounted in
the preceding section of this Article may be, they ought not to divert
our attention from the broader institutional implications of the
struggle over the 1995 revision of the APPCL. These implicate
relations between China's legislative and executive arms of
government, within the NPC, between Beijing and sub-national units
of government, and between state and society, all transpiring, as with
virtually every issue of significance in the PRC, against the backdrop
of the Communist Party.
183. Id. arts. 50-54.
184. Id. art. 57.
185. Id. art. 61.
186. Interview with Official A (2000), supra note 156; Interview with Official C, supra
note 156.
187. Interview with Official A (2000), supra note 156.
188. Id.
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To the extent that governmental bodies have been the
motivating force in developing China's law-making agenda,
throughout much of the history of the PRC, the impetus has reposed
with the administrative arm of the Chinese state. So it was through
the PRC's first four decades that the State Council played the
principal role among state organs in drawing up the legislative plans
that largely defined the NPC's priorities in law-making, while the
various ministries and commissions arrayed under the State Council
generally took the lead in shaping legislation. By the early 1990s,
however, this had begun to change. This was due in significant part
both to the efforts of a succession of important party personages-
Peng Zhen, Wan Li, Qiao Shi, and now Li Peng-who, whether for
their own political reasons, or for larger institutional purposes, or
some combination thereof, were determined to build up the NPC
relative to other parts of the state apparatus and also to the work of
the increasingly specialized committee structure and professionalized
staff fostered by the leadership.189 As a consequence, from the
opening of the Eighth National People's Congress in 1993, the NPC
Standing Committee has taken the lead in developing both five year
and annual legislative plans and in determining which combination of
NPC committees, other state agencies and actors outside the
government should undertake the initial drafting of key pieces of
national legislation.
The 1995 APPCL, arguably, presented an especially pronounced
example of this shift, as the ENRPC sought to take advantage of the
NPC's growing assertion of its prerogatives and to compensate for
what was understood at the time to be the relatively weak position
politically of NEPA by seizing the initiative and reworking NEPA's
preliminary draft into a relatively ambitious set of revisions to the
1987 APPCL.19° From one perspective, this shift of the focal point of
the drafting process would seem conducive to legislation that might
both represent a broader range of interests than that prepared under
the auspices of the State Council, given the wider spectrum of
constituencies seemingly having a voice in the NPC, and be better
crafted, given that body's growing expertise in legislative drafting.
The ENRPC's relative youth notwithstanding, for example,
informants suggest that it was able through the strength of its
189. See MURRAY SCOT TANNER, THE POLITICS OF LAWMAKING IN POST-MAO
CHINA, INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES AND DEMOCRATIC PROSPECrS (1999).
190. The 1987 APPCL had been drafted by the BLA. As the experience of the drafting
of the 2000 APPCL suggests, the elevation of SEPA to ministerial level appears to have
strengthened its position politically.
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leadership, which included the founding director of China's national
environmental agency, and through the intensity of its involvement in
a variety of law-making projects, rapidly to develop an expertise in
environmentally-focused drafting.'9'
From another vantage point, however, the putative rise of the
NPC and, in particular, of its specialized committees was not without
its costs in terms of the law-making process, at least at this relatively
early stage in their history. Again, the experience of the ENRPC with
the 1995 APPCL is illustrative. In its effort to control the drafting
process for the APPCL, the ENRPC did manage to develop for
presentation to the Standing Committee a set of proposals that, had
they found acceptance, would have substantially strengthened the
law. Arguably, however, the ENRPC draft engendered even more
pronounced opposition than might otherwise have been the case both
from ministries representing industrial and other interests that did not
believe that they had sufficient opportunity to register their views at
earlier stages in the process and from a BLA bureaucracy concerned
about a possible or, at least perceived, diminution of its authority.192
In effect, the belief that this specialized committee had been captured
by one set of special interests drove opponents even more strenuously
to seek to counter its work through other fora.
One such forum was the NPC's CLA. The issues raised by
efforts of the BLA and others to work through it go beyond their
dissatisfaction with what they perceived to be the ENRPC's stealth to
fundamental matters of institutional design. As its actions in the case
of the 1995 APPCL revisions suggest, the rise of the NPC to a more
prominent position in law-making has been accompanied by efforts of
the CLA to fulfill a variety of functions,193 some of which may, at
points, not be entirely consistent and for which it may not have
expertise (as in the technological questions raised by total loading and
other issues central to the proposed legislation). These have included
providing the full Standing Committee with technical assistance in
legal drafting, serving as an honest broker of the substantive views of
other potential actors within and beyond the NPC in the sense of
consolidating such views in draft legislation for presentation to the
Standing Committee, providing access for important entities whose
views might otherwise not reach the Standing Committee, and
espousing strong opinions, either as a mouthpiece for other actors or
191. Interview with Official A (1999), supra note 94; Interview with Official D (1997).
192. Interview with Academic AA, supra note 100.
193. Dowdle, supra note 69, at 64-78.
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of its own regarding the merits of legislative proposals emanating
from specialized committees.
The CLA is, of course, hardly unique among legislative
committees worldwide in wearing multiple hats (one thinks, for
example, of the confluence of substantive and technical roles of the
Rules Committee of the United States Senate). 194  Arguably,
however, this confluence has a potential to create particular havoc in
the Chinese setting in view of the relative absence of well-established
customary practices or well-publicized legal or other external
reference points that might provide a widely understood clarification
of its various roles. Notwithstanding the praise that one experienced
observer has accorded the CLA's multiplicity of roles for constituting
the first open acknowledgment "at China's central level [of] the value
of pluralist political dynamics,"'195 at least in the case of the 1995
APPCL uncertainty as to the CLA's purposes within the NPC process
appears to have deprived the ENRPC of what it deemed a sufficient
opportunity to familiarize itself with and respond to opposing
viewpoints (though some might suggest that such an outcome was
fitting, considering that ENRPC did not go out of its way to elicit
opposing views in preparing its original draft). Moreover, and
perhaps ultimately more significantly (as will be discussed further
below), the CLA's multiple roles contribute to the opacity of
governmental processes that remains a deterrent to the creation of
"pluralistic political dynamics" in Michael Dowdle's words, involving
more than political elites. 9 6
The uncertainty regarding the CLA's role (at least as concerns
the gathering of views from governmental actors beyond the NPC) is
perhaps better appreciated if considered in the context of the broader
relationship between the NPC and other state entities.
Notwithstanding a growing body of scholarship that quite
understandably heralds the rise over the past decade of the NPC
relative to its position in earlier times vis-a-vis the State Council,197 an
argument could be made that at least in some key respects, the NPC
is still, functionally, less the supreme organ of state and instead more
194. See, e.g., James J. Mangan, Contempt for the Fourth Estate: No Reporter's Privilege
Before a Congressional Investigation, 83 GEO. LJ. 129,138-39 (1994).
195. See DowdIe, supra note 69.
196. The need for greater transparency may be the biggest challenge confronting China
as it is about to enter the World Trade Organization.
197. See Dowdle, supra note 69; TANNER, supra note 189; CAi DINGJIAN, ZHONGGUO
RENDA ZHIDU [THE SYSTEM OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF CHINA]; Guo
DAOHUI, FA DE SHIDAI JINGSHEN [THE SPIRIT OF THE AGE OF LAW] (1997).
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analogous to one among many administrative agencies-and not an
especially powerful one at that. It is true that the NPC and its
Standing Committee enjoy sole authority to issue laws, but it is also
true that the authority to promulgate the implementing regulations
needed to make these laws fully operational reposes with the State
Council. Given the high level of generality in which much legislation
is framed, the wariness of administrative agencies about perceived
encroachments on their prerogatives, and the fact that courts, as a
practical matter, may lack the capacity routinely to secure agency
compliance, they provide regulatory authorities with the opportunity,
in effect, to rewrite or veto laws duly passed by the NPC.198
The 1995 APPCL illustrates both phenomena. As noted earlier,
the acid rain regulations include provisions specifically rejected
during the drafting of the very law from which they purportedly draw
authority.199 Conversely, the deadlock that eventually stifled the
general implementing regulations meant that provisions of the 1995
APPCL that required State Council action remained effectively in
abeyance, while many others continued to be vague both for those
who would regulate and those to whom the law might apply, at least
until the APPCL itself was revised in 2000. And although the 2000
law is significantly more stringent and detailed than was its immediate
predecessor, many provisions of the 2000 law now await specific
regulations from SEPA and the State Council. Although officials in
both the ENRPC and SEPA appear confident that they will be able
to pass such regulations, there is at least a significant risk that the
2000 law will experience some of the same pitfalls as the 1995 law.
These risks and difficulties are exacerbated, as one of the co-
authors has noted elsewhere, by the nature of the problems that
central governmental authorities have, even when dealing with a
more concrete body of law, in insuring that sub-national units of
government discharge their responsibilities in the manner that
national legislation envisions.2°° China is a unitary state in which sub-
national legislative and administrative measures are required to be
consistent with national legislation and in which the Standing
Committee has the authority to bring this about by invalidating any
198. This phenomenon is insightfully discussed in Donald C. Clarke, State Council
Notice Nullifies Statutory Rights of Creditors, 19 E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP. 9, Apr. 15,
1997. Concern about the reluctance of some governmental units to comply with court
orders was a major motivation for a campaign launched jointly in 1999 by the Supreme
People's Court and the Communist Party to promote better observance of judgments.
199. See supra notes 138-142 and accompanying text.
200. See Alford & Shen, supra note 17, at 139-43.
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sub-national enactments it deems inconsistent 201 Nonetheless, the
dependence of local officials of national bureaucracies and local
branches of the supposedly national judiciary on local governments
financially and in other ways can be a strong pull in a very different
direction, 202 while as a practical matter, the Standing Committee is
unable to review the torrent of legal measures being produced at the
sub-national level, notwithstanding the requirement of the newly
issued Law on Legislation that it do just that.203
One reason that the NPC may have difficulty in more fully
asserting its role as the supreme organ of state and highest legislative
body, or otherwise distinguishing itself from administrative agencies,
lies in the fact that it has but an attenuated public mandate upon
which it might rely to ground its legitimacy in general or buttress its
position with respect to particular measures. Talented scholars both
Chinese and foreign, including Cai Dingjian, Guo Daohui, Murray
Scot Tanner, Kevin O'Brien, and Michael Dowdle, have written on
the growing capacity of NPC delegates to serve as "agents and
remonstrators," to use O'Brien's phrase, and of the institution itself
to reflect the growing pluralization of interests and viewpoints in
today's China.204 As the case of the 1995 APPCL shows, the NPC
does, indeed, provide an arena in which competing interests can be
expressed and resolved. Nonetheless, we ought not to ignore the
limited character of that representation and the impact that it may
have upon the articulation of interests and their competition. The
3,000-odd delegates to the NPC's plenary session are not elected by
the public. Instead, the provincial Communist Party Standing
Committee and the provincial People's Congress each draw up lists of
nominees who are then acted upon by the latter and its standing
committee.205 The former list includes candidates proposed by the
NPC Standing Committee itself and/or in consultation with
organizations representing various societal interests, though it should
be remembered that such groups are typically constituted from the
201. See PETER HOWARD CORNE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA: THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL SYSTEM (1997).
202 See Alford & Shen, supra note 17, at 140.
203. CAI, supra note 197, at 310; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifa Fa [The Law on
Legislation of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated Mar. 15,2000).
204. Kevin J. O'Brien, Agents and Remonstrators: Role Accumulation by Chinese
People's Congress Deputies, 138 CHINA Q. 359,359 (1994) [hereinafter O'Brien, Agents];
KEVIN J. O'BRIEN, REFORM WITHOUT LIBERALIZATION: CHINA'S NATIONAL
PEOPLE'S CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF INSTrTUTIONAL CHANGE (1990) [hereinafter
O'BRIEN, REFORM]; CAI, supra note 197; Guo, supra note 197; Dowdle, supra note 69.
205. See DowdIe, supra note 69, at 37-38.
March 2001] CLEAN AIR, CLEAR PROCESSES?
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
top down and likely to be comprised, especially at the leadership
level, of Communist Party members.20 6
Whatever the case may be with respect to delegates to the NPC's
plenary session, it is even more pronounced with respect to its
Standing Committee, which, by virtue, inter alia, of passing the bulk
of national legislation, determining much of the agenda for the
plenary session, and being charged with identifying conflicts between
national and sub-national legislation is, at least functionally, China's
most consequential legislative body. The Standing Committee's 155-
odd delegates are nominated by the preceding Standing Committee
and then voted upon by the full plenary membership at the outset of
each session.207 Approximately one-half of the Standing Committee's
members are said to represent particular parts of the country while
the other half have an unofficial interest group constituency-based
portfolio (such as the All China Women's Federation, as Dowdle
notes).20 8 In actuality, the large majority of delegates live in Beijing
(60-80% according to some counts),20 9 which ought not to be
surprising, given that they meet regularly, and are selected from
government or state-led civic organizations and, indeed, in some
instances, have held such positions concurrently with serving on the
Standing Committee.210
The issue of popular representation arguably poses a particular
dilemma for advocates within and beyond the Chinese government of
stricter environmental regulation. Sensing that they lack the political
power of their opponents, at least some such advocates have thought
that their position might be enhanced by a careful and selective
enlisting of public opinion in their cause. Toward that end, they have
encouraged the publication in sympathetic state media of stories
making their case, elicited "public" opinion about pending legislation
(more systematically in the case of the water and land use laws than
the 1995 APPCL), and have sought to use the NPC's investigative
powers (zhifa diaocha) to draw attention to their cause. 211
206. See O'Brien, Agents, supra note 204, at 364.
207. Dowdle, supra note 69, at 39-40.
208. Id.
209. See O'BRIEN, REFORM, supra note 204.
210. Id.
211. Interview with Official D (1997), supra note 191; Interview with Official A (1999),
supra note 94. See, e.g., Bian Jian, Quanguo Renda Zhifa Diaocha Zu Jinri Qicheng [The
Recent Launch of the NPC's Investigation of Law Implementation], ZHONGGUO
HUANJING BAO [CHINA ENVIRONMENTAL NEWSPAPER], May 15, 1998, at 1 (discussing
zhifa diaocha with reference to the oceanic environmental protection law).
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As adroit as these efforts may have been-and the ENRPC's
utilization of the zhifa diaocha process to, inter alia, establish hotlines
on which citizens could anonymously report pollution problems in
Beijing, Tianjin, and other major locales garnered considerable
attention 212-they raise very difficult questions on at least two
discrete levels. First, the relatively high profile approach these
actions suggest is in some tension with less publicized attempts by the
ENRPC, working with NEPA, to take advantage of the NPC's rising
status to push emerging parliamentary procedures to their fullest as
an avenue for advancing more environmentally focused legislation.
Even more importantly, the invocation by advocates of stricter
environmental regulation of public opinion runs the risk of
"politicizing" environmental issues.
Ironically, throughout the history of the PRC, the environment
has not been considered to involve politics, at least in the sense of
raising questions about the authority of the Communist Party,
notwithstanding the ways in which this issue has implicated interest
group politics of the type that cut across the Party described earlier in
this Article and has been the focus of some of the more pronounced
and violent expressions of popular discontent in various localities
across the nation.213 Indeed, some Chinese observers have suggested
that the perception that matters of the environment are largely
divorced from front line politics may be a prime reason accounting
for much of whatever success pro-environmental forces have
achieved, 214 while one co-author of this study has argued elsewhere
that low political visibility may also be a primary factor in the rapid
spread of environmentally focused litigation (including class
actions). 215 The effort to enlist public opinion to advance an
environmental agenda may now have the unintended effect of
demonstrating that, contrary to earlier assumptions, issues of the
environment have the potential to pose very substantial questions of
an intensely political nature with implications both for
environmentally-oriented forces and Chinese authorities in general.
This is particularly so as these issues implicate the amassing at a
central level of expressions of public discontent and as they highlight
212 Interview with Official D (1997), supra note 191.
213. Jun Jing, Environmental Protests in Rural China, in CHINESE SOCIETY: CHANGE,
CONFLICT, AND RESISTANCE 143,144 (Elizabeth J. Perry & Mark Selden eds., 2000).
214. Interview with Official A (1999), supra note 94.
215. Benjamin L. Liebman, Note, Class Action Litigation in China, 111 HARV. L. REV.
1523 (1997).
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the need for institutional channels through which such concerns might
be articulated.
If institutional design may account in part for dimensions of the
1995 APPCL-such as its generality-that made enforcement
problematic, it also, ironically, suggests paths for the law's further
development. Although advocates of the 1995 revision of the APPCL
were disappointed by their inability either to incorporate in the
APPCL itself or re-capture through comprehensive implementing
regulations many environmentally protective measures of the type
discussed earlier in this Article, at least some believe that they were
able to turn what many observers might deem serious structural
problems-including the general language in which the APPCL and
many other laws have typically been cast and the growing functional
autonomy of sub-national units of government-to advantage.216 So
it is that sub-national authorities in parts of the country that evidence
a relatively high concern with environmental issues and that enjoy
relative proximity to inexpensive sources of cleaner fuels cited the
1995'APPCL to justify adopting measures such as tighter local
standards regarding sulphur content and firm deadlines concerning
the use of leaded gasoline. The Beijing and Shanghai governments,
for instance, have been at the forefront of such measures: during
internal debates over local rules, they cited Article 7 of the 1995
APPCL, which specifically authorizes sub-national authorities to set
discharge standards that are "more stringent" than their national
counterparts, as evidence of higher support for a cleaner environment
in order to establish the nation's first mandated phase-out of leaded
gasoline.217 Proponents of stronger environmental regulation at the
national level, in turn, have relied on such sub-national examples to
demonstrate that stronger regulation does not necessarily entail
weakened economic performance or other difficulties, thereby
buttressing their own calls for further revision of the APPCL.218
Most notable, of course, has been the 2000 revision of the
APPCL. Officials involved in drafting the new law attribute their
success to three factors. First, and foremost, they state that overall
consciousness about environmental problems, within the government
and among the general population, increased significantly between
1995 and 1999,219 as China witnessed a massive decline in air quality
216. Interview vith Academic A, supra note 65; Interview with Official A (1999), supra
note 94.
217. Id.
218. Interview with Official A (1999), supra note 94.
219. Interview with Official A (2000), supra note 156.
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nationwide. Although pollution was serious in the early 1990s,
government and popular awareness of the problem was just beginning
to form. By 1999, the seriousness of China's air pollution crisis could
not be ignored. Concepts such as total loading, which had been
fought over fiercely in the 1995 revisions, had already been
incorporated into other governmental measures and policy
statements by the time revisions were again being considered, so that
by 2000 the perceived radicalness of these measures had decreased.
In particular, the State Council's 1998 reply (pifu) on acid rain, which
explicitly referred to total loading,2 0 provided the ENRPC with a
significantly changed legal and political backdrop, meaning that the
ENRPC no longer needed to incorporate entirely new concepts into
the law.
Second, the ENRPC's success also appears to have resulted in
part because the committee learned from its experience in 1995. The
ENRPC, backed by a strengthened environmental ministry, sought
comments on the 2000 law early in the drafting process, and thus
appears to have been aware of industrial ministry concerns well ahead
of the bill's first reading. Officials state that they did a much better
job both of soliciting views regarding the law and of explaining the
need for the law.221 The ENRPC held a series of meetings designed
to "seek views," attended by representatives of affected industries
and local governments. This work was also done much earlier in the
drafting process than had been the case with the 1995 law.222
The ENRPC also appears to have been relatively successful in
incorporating "public views" into the law. The ENRPC and SEPA
conducted a series of investigations of environmental conditions at
the local level, collecting materials both on the seriousness of
environmental problems and on public attitudes toward the
environment.223 The ENRPC used these investigations to support its
220. Reply of the State Council, supra note 140, art. 2.
221. Interview with Official A (2000), supra note 156; Interview with Official C, supra
note 156.
222. Interview with Official A (2000), supra note 156.
223. Id.; Interview with Official C, supra note 156. For example, a 1998 SEPA
nationwide survey on environmental attitudes, published in 1999, found that while
environmental consciousness generally remains low, 56.7% of the people polled rated
pollution as either "extremely serious" or "relatively serious." The survey found that 86%
of respondents attributed environmental problems to the failure to enforce laws or the
failure to obey laws; only a very small percentage of respondents stated that the problem
was with weaknesses in laws themselves. See GUOJIA HUANJING BAOHU ZONGJU
[STATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ADMINISTRATION], JIAOYU BU [MINISTRY OF
EDUCATION], QUANGUO GONGGONG HUANJING YISHI DIAOCHA BAOGAO [REPORT
ON THE NATIONWIDE SURVEY ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS] No. 4 (1999).
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arguments that public 'concern for the environment had increased
dramatically, and that the public was demanding tougher
environmental standards.
After the draft was completed, it was also circulated to each
province and major city; the provinces in turn were responsible for
seeking views from subordinate levels of government. The ENRPC
incorporated these views into a book, which, along with other
materials regarding the need for revisions to the APPCL, was then
provided to the NPC Standing Committee.224 Thus it appears, at a
minimum, that the law was presented to the Standing Committee in a
form designed to show that the ENRPC had done its homework.
Third, part of the ENRPC's success in winning passage of the
2000 law may also be attributable to changes in the CLA. Whereas
the CLA was a chief obstacle to tougher regulations in 1995, in 2000 it
appears to have cooperated with the ENRPC.z25 At the very least,
the CLA does not seem to have acted as an advocate for opponents
of the law, as it had done in 1995.226
Changes in the CLA's approach to the APPCL may derive not
only from changes in its views of environmental legislation, but also
from changes in how the CLA views the specialized committees.
Officials comment that since the beginning of the 9th NPC in 1998,
the CLA has taken a more accommodating role toward its specialized
committees, attempting to work with the drafts they provide, instead
of assuming that the drafts require significant rewriting.2 27 Although
changed political attitudes toward the environment appear to have
been the primary reason the 2000 APPCL passed with little trouble,
comments regarding an institutional shift in the CLA's approach to
draft laws suggests at least a possible trend worth further research.
Although officials involved in drafting the 2000 APPCL state
that its progress through the NPC was relatively smooth, the law did
face fierce opposition.22s  In particular, electricity producers
(reorganized into companies after the abolishment of the electricity
ministry) fought against its provisions regarding acid rain districts and
sulphur dioxide districts. Electricity producers requested that the
Economic and Finance Committee of the NPC oppose the law, and
224. Interview with Official A (2000), supra note 156; Interview with Official C, supra
note 156.
225. Interview with Official A (2000), supra note 156.
226. Id.
227. Id.; Interview with Official B (2000).
228. Interview with Official A (2000), supra note 156.
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also sought to influence the changes through other channels.229
Likewise, the coal industry, automobile producers, and the
construction industry opposed various portions of the law, both
through the Economic and Finance Committee and directly through
meetings held by the ENRPC to receive opinions regarding the law.230
The nuances of the debates over the 2000 revisions are beyond
the scope of this Article, which was largely completed prior to the
passage of the 2000 APPCL. It is tempting to view the 2000 APPCL
as somehow bringing closure to the controversy over the 1995 law,
with environmentalists coming out on top this time. In many ways,
the story of the 2000 law appears consistent with that of the 1995 law,
with a fierce clash between environmentalists and industry
representatives, albeit with a different result in 2000 than in 1995.
The 2000 revisions are also consistent with a view of the NPC
continuing to increase the depth and scope of its legislative drafting,
with specialized committees, and in particular the ENRPC, still in the
process of defining the particular roles they should play. Indeed,
ENRPC officials clearly appear to have learned valuable political
skills as a result of their defeat before the Standing Committee in
1995.
Yet it would also most likely be a mistake to read too much into
the 2000 revisions. The ENRPC success was also heavily dependent
on a changed political atmosphere, and in particular on the decision
of the central government to make environmental protection a
national priority. The ENRPC and SEPA have helped raise
awareness of the need for tighter environmental regulations, and thus
perhaps have played a role in altering how China's leaders conceive
of environmental problems. In the end, however, it appears that the
greater rigor of the 2000 APPCL was made possible because the
central government had decided that curbing pollution would be a
priority; viewed in this light the NPC appears to be continuing to act
within the context of a system in which the central government (and
thus the Party), not the NPC, is setting the terms of the political
debate.
Therein lies both an irony and a larger lesson about the evolving
role of the NPC. Because the Communist Party did not treat the
environment as involving core political issues through the mid-1990s,
the ENRPC and NEPA were able to achieve some victories through
parliamentary maneuvers and a careful tapping of public opinion, but
229. Id.
230. Id.
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these triumphs were modest. It was only when the central leadership
began to appreciate the extent to which environmental problems
might be destabilizing and to mount vigorous national campaigns to
foster environmental awareness that the ENRPC was able to push
through strong air pollution legislation.
It is tempting to read this history as the product of the growing
autonomy and institutional development of the NPC. There is, to be
sure, something to be said for this perspective, given the ways in
which the ENRPC was able to elicit and give voice to popular views,
at least among intelligentsia and similar elites in Beijing and
Shanghai. Representation is, after all, a prime function of legislative
bodies. One could, however, alternatively read this same history as
indicative of how tied the NPC remains to orthodoxy laid down by
the Party. In this account, the different fates of the ENPRC's two
efforts to promote a strong air pollution law may be explained by the
fact that the Party leadership, which did not view the environment as
politically freighted in 1995, had come to embrace at least the rhetoric
of environmentalism by 2000. And while it is true that the impetus
for that embrace owes something to rising public opinion that the
ENRPC has helped articulate, the NPC's role appears less that of a
pluralistic, democratic body providing routinized outlets for the
expression of citizen viewpoints generally and more that of another
elite bureaucratic entity whose role remains incompletely defined in a
world in which political power, at least in central government and
party circles, continues to be tightly held.
Stated differently, although the NPC is maturing as a legislative
body, it continues to operate on a playing field that remains in
,significant respects pre-set by the Party. Responsiveness to certain
concerns from elite circles, though arguably laudable, is not
necessarily equivalent to democratization. Law does matter in
China-as evidenced in sectoral battles over substantive issues such
as coal washing and more symbolic skirmishing over use of the label
"illegal," not to mention the extensive procedural maneuvering
between the NPC and State Council. Yet we would be well-advised
not to lose sight of the institutional context within which it operates.
China is not alone in suffering from problems of institutional design
when it comes to combating air pollution, as Ackerman and Hassler
demonstrated years ago with respect to the United States, but that
provides scant consolation to those who hope to bring law to bear in
addressing the PRC's many and serious environmental dilemmas.
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